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A Retail Sales / Sales Tax Paradox 




Small communities experiencing slow to negative growth sometimes increase their local 
sales tax rate in order to maintain or expand public services.  A cross-sectional, time 
series model is used to investigate possible unintended consequences.  Negative 





Many non-metropolitan communities have faced and continue to face challenges 
in recent decades.  For many, population growth has been slow or negative.  Employment 
growth has followed a similar, if not more severe, path.  Commuting to jobs in other 
communities is increasing.  Greater mobility and e-commerce have resulted in increased 
out-shopping.  Many downtown shopping areas have withered as shoppers turn to 
regional trade centers and super-stores for lower prices, more variety, and one-stop 
shopping.  Small communities experiencing these economic phenomena suffer not only 
the loss of trade activity, but also the loss of tax revenue to support local public services 
and infrastructure.  Property tax and sales tax are the primary sources of local 
government revenue.  An Oklahoma Municipal League survey of cities’ 2000-2001 
budgets reveals that the largest revenue source (36%) is sales tax revenue.  Both sales and 
property tax depend upon the level of local economic activity and wealth. 
Despite declining economic conditions in many communities, the people of these 
communities want to maintain their community.  Community services such as law 
enforcement, road maintenance, and public education require local funding from property 
and sales taxes.  If property values and taxable retail sales are not growing, maintenance 
of local public services may require a tax rate increase.  Property taxes seem to be 
especially unpopular as a tool for raising additional revenue and, in some instances, such 
as in Oklahoma, tax rates are fixed by the state constitution.  Sales tax rates may be the 
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only politically viable option.  Yet, as sale tax rates rise, the effective price of taxable 
goods rise.  Classical economic theory indicates that rising prices will result in less 
quantity demanded and / or substitution effects.  Hence, a rising sales tax may have both 
income and substitution effects.  The greater the price increase, the greater the effects.  
This paper seeks to address the question: will a local sales tax increase risk a decline in 
sales tax revenue?  In other words, is there a point at which the tax rate is so large as to 
have the unintended effect of reducing local retail trade and sales tax revenue levels? 
 
Background 
The goal of this paper is to shed some light on the consequences of increasing 
local sales tax rates, particularly in non-metropolitan counties.  This is similar to 
Mikesell’s objective for central cities.  Several studies have found decreased local retail 
trade in communities’ whose local sales tax rate exceeds that of surrounding communities 
(Fisher, Love, Mikesell, Snodgrass and Otto, Walsh and Jones).  Other studies have 
explored the factors affecting the relative level of retail activity, measured by pull-factors, 
in rural areas (Ebai and Harris, Gale, Gruidl and Andrianocos, Yanagida, et al.).  Here, 
the questions are aimed at the closely related questions of local government revenue 
generation.  The specific objective is to test the hypothesis that the addition of a county 
sales tax may actually decrease local retail trade, hence being counter-productive.   
Dauffenbach shows that the average city sales tax rate in Oklahoma has increased 
from 2.1% in 1980 to 3.2% in 1999.  Authority for county government sale taxes was 
granted in 1984.  Four counties adopted a county sales tax that year. Today sixty-two of 
seventy-seven counties levy a county sales tax.  Counties have increasingly looked to the 
sales tax as the only option for raising significant sums.  Maximum property tax rates 
were placed in the state constitution in the 1930s and every county has been levying the 
maximum rate for decades.  Local government (city + county) sales tax rates vary from 
1% to 6%.  City rates vary from 1% to 5% while county rates range from zero to 2%.  
The state sales tax rate is 4.5%. 
On average, city sales tax rates have increased by almost the same amount over 
the last twenty years without regard to city population (Dauffenbach).  Among counties, a 
larger proportion of smaller population counties have adopted a sales tax and smaller     4
counties adopted sales taxes sooner than large counties (Lansford).  Furthermore, a 
relatively large proportion of the small counties adopting a sales tax are also losing 
population.   
 
Method 
The econometric models use total taxable sales as the dependent variable.  
Taxable sales are a proxy for local retail sales.  (Models using per capita retail sales give 
parallel results except for the coefficient on population.)  The independent variables 
include per capita personal income, population, sales tax rate, and USDA’s rural-urban 
continuum code.  Socio-economic variables, such as age groups, are not included.  The 
primary reason for their exclusion is the lack of time series data for these variables.  A 
second reason is that these may not be needed in order to test the tax rate hypotheses.  
The model is not attempting to explain all variability but is focused on variability due to 
rate changes.  The data is annual data for 68 rural Oklahoma counties over 1984 – 1998.  
The econometric model is estimated using the SAS PROC REG and PROC MIXED 
procedures.  Heteroskedasticity is indicated and corrected in both cases.  PROC MIXED 
finds the maximum likelihood estimates assuming error components and 
heteroskedasticity.     
A log-log model is used of the form: 
Retail = Mrate + (Mrate)
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Where Retail = the natural log of taxable monthly municipal retail sales 
  Mrate = the natural log of the municipal sales tax rate
2 
 (Mrate)
2 = the square of the natural log of the municipal sales tax rate 
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  Crate = the county government sales tax rate, if any 
  Pop = the natural log of estimated municipal population by BEA
3 or the Census
4 
  Mpci = natural log of municipal per capita income based on the 1990 census and  
scaled to other years using the implicit price deflator, gross national  
product.  
RU = Rural-urban continuum dummies are based on the rural-urban  
continuum code defined by ERS USDA
5 and takes into account county  
populations and county location relative to urban areas.  The base dummy  
is “urbanized adjacent” and is defined as counties with urban population  
of at least 20,000 and located adjacent to a metropolitan area. 
  DYR = Year dummies are included for each year with 1998 being the base year. 
  Error terms of a specific community may be high or low year after year.  The 
correlation within the cross-section across time is captured with a random effects model.  
The model is estimated using PROC MIXED in SAS. 
 
Data 
Sales tax collections for every city municipality (city or town) and county that 
collected a sales tax from 1984 – 1998 are included with a few exceptions.  The Cities of 
Tulsa and Oklahoma City plus their counties are excluded due to their relatively massive 
size relative to other cities in the state.  Data for four small towns were excluded due to 
missing population or per capita income estimates.  The final data set includes 478 
municipalities and a total of 5,383 observations.  Because a county or city may change 
their sales tax rate in any month in any year, the Oklahoma Tax Commission reports 
annual collections by rate by number of months.  Tax collections at a given rate were 
divided by the number of months a given rate was in effect to calculate the monthly 
average collections for each city or county at a given rate.  Dividing monthly collections 
by the applicable rate produces the monthly, taxable retail sales.  Footnotes to the model 
equation provide further information on sources of data. 
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Table 1 gives descriptive statistics for the data set.  Monthly sales tax collections 
are the basis for the retail sales estimates.  The populations of the 478 communities range 
from 16 to 65,140 with an average population of 2,479.  The median population is only 
950.  Monthly sales tax collections range from $18 in a small town to almost $1.5 
million.  Municipal tax rates range from 1% to 5% with the average being 2.56%.  The 
median, however, is 3.0% and 50% of cities and towns have a sales tax rate of 3.0%.  Per 
capita incomes range widely over the 1984 – 1998 period with the average being $8,698. 
The rural-urban continuum, devised in 1993, indicates 8% of the communities are 
classified as urbanized
6 and adjacent to a metropolitan area (Ghelfi and Parker).  The 
largest proportion (48%) of communities are categorized as “Less urban adjacent.
7”  
Thus, most counties are physically adjacent to either an Oklahoma metropolitan area or a 
metropolitan area such as Fort Smith, Arkansas or Sherman-Denison, Texas.  Another 
26% of the observations come from “Less urban non-adjacent” counties. 
 
Results 
  The model appears to have a reasonably good fit.  F tests and Chi-square tests for 
the OLS and random effects models, respectively, are highly significant.  The OLS model 
R-square is 0.95.  All coefficient estimates are significant at the 95% level with the 
exception of a few “year” dummies.  Because estimated coefficients are very similar in 
both, discussion will focus on the random effects model results. 
At first blush the sales tax rate coefficients appear to have unexpected signs.  The 
Mrate coefficient might be expected to be positively signed and the (Mrate)
2 coefficient 
negatively signed.  However, when you consider that the natural log of tax rates ranging 
from 0.01 to 0.05 will be negative numbers, the signs on the coefficients make sense.  In 
fact, the quadratic form then takes on the usual behavior.  All other things constant, the 
model indicates retail sales increasing at the lower end of the range of sales tax rates.   
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Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics, Oklahoma Communities, 1984 - 1998 
Variable Mean  SD  Min.  Max. 
Monthly Sales Tax 
Collections            40,621          113,142                   18        1,449,772 
Retail $, Monthly Retail Sales 
Estimate       1,430,682       3,797,739                 455      36,980,711 
Mrate, Municipal Sales Tax 
Rate            0.0256            0.0069            0.0100             0.0500 
log(Mrate) -3.7063 0.3097 -4.6052  -2.9957
Crate, County Sales Tax Rate            0.0036            0.0050  0.0000           0.0200 
Pop, Municipal population              2,479              5,190                   16             65,140 
Mpci, Municipal per capita 
income              8,698              2,190              2,503             19,818 
RU1, urbadj, Urban adjacent            0.0799            0.2711  0  1
RU2, urbnadj, Urban non-
adjacent            0.0516            0.2213  0  1
RU3, lurbadj, Less urban 
adjacent            0.4798            0.4996  0  1
RU4, lurbnadj, Less urban 
non-adjacent            0.2556            0.4362  0  1
RU5, ruradj, Rural adjacent            0.0424            0.2014  0  1
RU6, rurnadj, Rural non-
adjacent            0.0907            0.2871  0  1
Rural-Urban Continuum Code           6.4009            1.2049            4.0000             9.0000 
DYR1, 1984            0.0684            0.2524  0  1
DYR2, 1985            0.0615            0.2402  0  1
DYR3, 1986            0.0635            0.2439  0  1
DYR4, 1987            0.0646            0.2459  0  1
DYR5, 1988            0.0663            0.2489  0  1
DYR6, 1989            0.0654            0.2472  0  1
DYR7, 1990            0.0676            0.2511  0  1
DYR8, 1991            0.0669            0.2498  0  1
DYR9, 1992            0.0672            0.2505  0  1
DYR10, 1993            0.0680            0.2518  0  1
DYR11, 1994            0.0678            0.2514  0  1
DYR12, 1995            0.0682            0.2521  0  1
DYR13, 1996            0.0682            0.2521  0  1
DYR14, 1997            0.0671            0.2502  0  1
1998            0.0693            0.2540  0  1    8
Table 2. Regression Results, Weighted to Correct for Heteroscedasticity 
  OLS  Random Effects Model 
Variable  Estimate  t Value    Estimate  DF  t Value 
Intercept -11.3069  -12.14  -11.2865 477 -12.17 
Mrate -2.9909  -6.44  -2.9912 4635 -6.52 
(Mrate)
2 -0.3944  -6.44  -0.3960 4635 -6.54 
Crate 3.7152  2.54  4.0790 4635 2.79 
Pop 1.2899  207.13  1.2923 4635 197.38 
Mpci 1.0268  24.77  1.0254 4635 24.45 
urbnadj -0.1726  -4.20  -0.1972 4635 -4.72 
lurbadj 0.1741  6.14  0.1577 4635 5.46 
lurbnadj 0.1230  4.23  0.1085 4635 3.67 
ruradj 0.1487  2.76  0.1535 4635 2.82 
rurnadj 0.1882  4.75  0.1794 4635 4.46 
1984 -0.1153  -2.92  -0.1096 4635 -2.78 
1985 -0.1004  -2.37  -0.0823 4635 -1.95 
1986 -0.1866  -4.76  -0.1825 4635 -4.67 
1987 -0.2943  -8.10  -0.2739 4635 -7.57 
1988 -0.2102  -5.48  -0.1991 4635 -5.21 
1989 -0.2343  -6.06  -0.2206 4635 -5.73 
1990 -0.0838  -2.26  -0.0652 4635 -1.76 
1991 -0.0961  -2.59  -0.0953 4635 -2.58 
1992 -0.1070  -3.05  -0.0986 4635 -2.82 
1993 -0.1900  -6.18  -0.1876 4635 -6.13 
1994 -0.0733  -2.02  -0.0794 4635 -2.19 
1995 -0.0420  -1.21  -0.0414 4635 -1.20 
1996 0.0122  0.39  0.0137 4635 0.44 
1997 -0.0284  -0.79  -0.0246 4635 -0.69 
           
Adjusted R
2  0.95  Residual Log Likelihood  -4,474.5 
F   4,026  Chi-Square    93.89 
 
 
Table 3.  Elasticity of Retail with Respect to Various Municipal Sales Tax Rates 
Rate  0.01  0.015 0.02 0.025 0.03 0.035 0.04 0.045 0.05
Elasticity  0.66 0.33 0.11 -0.07 -0.21 -0.34 -0.44 -0.54  -0.62
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However, sales increase at a decreasing rate.  Specifically, the model indicates increasing 
sales as the sales tax rate increases from 1% to approximately 2.3%.  At higher rates retail 
sales decrease.  Since the average municipal sales tax rate is 2.46%, the model’s 
estimates make sense.  Other things equal, communities with lower rates would tend to  
attract more shoppers and experience greater sales volume.  Communities with higher 
rates would have relatively higher prices and tend to receive a lower proportion of sales. 
  The coefficient estimate for Crate, the county sales tax rate, is more troublesome 
to interpret.  It is positively signed rather than negatively signed as hypothesized.  Note 
further that, due to many observations with Crate = 0, it was not placed in log form.
  Table 3 provides an evaluation of retail sales elasticity with respect to municipal 
sales tax rates.  Inelasticity is shown over the entire range of observed sales tax rates.  At 
rates 2.5% or more, the elasticity turns negative, indicating reduction in retail sales as 
rates rise. 
  A coefficient greater than one on population indicates the expected agglomeration 
or economies of size effect.  Larger towns and cities will have more retail stores and a 
greater selection of merchandise.  Consumers will tend to shop for basics near home but 
for higher priced durable goods and non-essentials they will often allocate more time for 
shopping.  Hence, larger population municipalities, especially regional trade centers will 
typically have larger retail sales volume relative to their population.  Similarly, the 
parameter estimate on per capita income is positive and greater than one indicating that 
higher income populations will spend more on normal economic goods.  
  Coefficients on the rural-urban continuum indicator variables are statistically 
significant but most have signs contrary to expectations.  For example, it is expected that 
communities located adjacent to metropolitan areas will experience a loss of retail sales 
due to the convenience of shopping at the adjacent metropolitan area.  By contrast, it was 
expected that non-adjacent areas would have relatively larger retail sales due to relatively 
remote location.  The model results, however, show a negatively signed coefficient for 
urban non-adjacent (urbnadj) communities.  This implies that their retail sales were less 
than those of urbanized areas adjacent to metropolitan areas.  Part of this may be 
explained by urban sprawl.  As metropolitan areas grow, one result of their growth is the     10
“urbanization” of the surrounding areas.  This urbanization spills into adjacent counties 
stimulating growth of suburban shopping areas.  This may explain some of the results. 
  The year dummy variables capture structural changes in the overall economy such 
as inflation, economic expansion, changes in interest rates, and so on. Since 1998 was the 
base year, it was expected that earlier years would be negatively signed.  For years 1995 
through 1997, the coefficients were not statistically significant.  Their insignificance is 
not of particular concern.  These years, close to the base year, were years of relatively 
low inflation, and occur during a time of relative stability in the general economy. 
 
Results, Model 2 
  The Crate parameter in the first model implies that increasing the county sales tax 
rate will increase local retail sales volume and directly conflicts with the results for the 
municipal sales tax rate.  Since community taxpayers face a local tax rate equal to the 
municipal rate plus the county rate, it seems prudent to combine them into a single local 
rate and re-estimate the model equation parameters.  The results are shown in Table 4.  
Trate is the variable name assigned to the sum of Mrate and Crate. 
  The two regression procedures again provide very similar parameter estimates and 
fit the data reasonably well.  All parameter estimates except those on the last two dummy 
variables are significant at the alpha level of 5%.  As with the previous results, the 
parameters for the random effects model will be discussed.  The parameter of interest is 
the total local tax rate, Trate.   
  As the total local tax rate increases, it is expected that retail sales will decrease.  
The elasticities of sales volume (in dollars) with respect to local tax rate is displayed in 
Table 5.  The table shows the actual range of combined city and county rates being used 
across the state.  As in the previous model, there is positive inelasticity at lower sales tax 
rates.  As rates approach the average rate of 2.9%, the elasticity approaches zero.  It 
becomes negative at approximately 3.2%.  Hence, as a community increases its sales tax 
rate above the norm, it risks losing retail sales and the accompanying sales tax revenue. 
  Table 6 provides an illustration of the results for a selected set of sales tax rates at 
the median city population and all other variable values at the averages.  Population of 
1,000 was selected as it is near the median population of 950.  Tax rates of 2%, 3%, and     11
3.5% are the first quartile, median, and third quartile rates of the observations.  Retail 
sales are shown to slightly decline when the rate moves from 3% to 3.5%.  Actual 
community experience will surely vary.  When consumers confront a new sales tax rate, 
it is unlikely they will fully react to it immediately.  Therefore, trade would not be 
expected to decline immediately but over time.  The evidence, however, does show that 
consumers do change their behavior.  How rapidly, we do not know.  
 
Table 4.  Model 2 Regression Results, Weighted to Correct for Heteroscedasticity 
  OLS  Random Effects Model 
Variable  Estimate  t Value  Estimate  DF  t Value 
Intercept -4.4559  -5.64 -4.5722 477 -5.77 
Trate   -0.9012  -2.19 -0.9886 4635 -2.42 
Trate
2 -0.1310  -2.33 -0.1435 4635 -2.57 
Pop 1.3269  210.10 1.3276 4635 203.06 
Mpci 0.6981  17.24 0.6955 4635 16.97 
urbnadj -0.1676  -4.45 -0.1947 4635 -5.08 
lurbadj 0.1666  6.25 0.1479 4635 5.43 
lurbnadj 0.1445  5.28 0.1276 4635 4.59 
ruradj 0.2430  4.83 0.2448 4635 4.81 
rurnadj 0.2531  6.82 0.2438 4635 6.47 
1984 -0.2460  -6.31 -0.2375 4635 -6.09 
1985 -0.1354  -3.70 -0.1318 4635 -3.61 
1986 -0.2296  -5.88 -0.2264 4635 -5.83 
1987 -0.2765  -7.22 -0.2721 4635 -7.14 
1988 -0.2638  -7.38 -0.2589 4635 -7.26 
1989 -0.2797  -7.63 -0.2716 4635 -7.44 
1990 -0.1576  -4.50 -0.1437 4635 -4.13 
1991 -0.1542  -4.65 -0.1584 4635 -4.80 
1992 -0.1038  -2.93 -0.1077 4635 -3.05 
1993 -0.1935  -6.20 -0.1953 4635 -6.31 
1994 -0.0994  -2.89 -0.1061 4635 -3.11 
1995 -0.0692  -2.04 -0.0741 4635 -2.21 
1996 -0.0505  -1.50 -0.0545 4635 -1.63 
1997 -0.0412  -1.31 -0.0383 4635 -1.23 
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Table 5.  Elasticity of Retail Sales with respect to Various Local Sales Tax Rate Levels 
Rate  0.01 0.02  0.025 0.03 0.035 0.04 0.045 0.05  0.06
Elasticity  0.33 0.13 0.07 0.02 -0.03 -0.06 -0.10 -0.13  -0.18
 
 
Table 6.  Estimated Retail Sales per Month at the Median Population and Selected Rates 
  Sales Tax Rates 
Pop. 2.0%  3.0% 3.5%
1,000         322,278      332,359     332,137 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
  This analysis focuses on the relationship between retail sales and local sales tax 
rates.  Fifteen years of sales tax information (collections and rates) for all non-
metropolitan counties is employed.  Cities and towns are largely dependent upon sales tax 
receipts for financing their services.  In the specific time period considered, county 
governments were increasingly employing the sales tax since it is the only viable 
alternative for significant sums.  At the same time, many rural communities have 
experienced population decline similar to that found in many other states.  Dwindling 
population and stagnant or declining tax base has motivated numerous rural communities 
to ask their citizens to approve a sales tax increase so that local public service can be 
maintained and/or expanded.  The question to be addressed is whether or not sales tax 
increases might be counter-productive, both in terms of revenue collections and local 
economic retail trade activity. 
  The strengths of the current analysis include the number of years and 
inclusiveness of he observations.  The statistical tests show relatively high statistical 
significance and the models appear to provide a good fit.  Some drawbacks are the 
unexpected signs on some variables such as the county sales tax rate.  Future research 
may also benefit by inclusion of specific socio-economic variables such as demographic 
groups.  Additional trade area information would be of use.  Specifically, factors such as 
distance to regional trade centers and relative sales tax rate within a trade area could be 
helpful.  Defining trade areas, however, may present a challenge.  Nevertheless, it seems 
clear that alternative measures to the “rural-urban continuum code” need to be found.     13
  Another strategy for addressing the question of whether or not and how rapidly 
community consumers react to a sales tax increase is with an event study.  Selected 
communities that have changed their rates can be examined over time.  This was part of 
the authors’ original goal but has not yet been achieved. 
  In conclusion, this analysis strongly suggests that increasing the local sales tax 
rate above the average sales tax rate will have a negative effect on taxable retail sales and 
on sales tax collections (all other things being equal).  The elasticity of retail sales with 
respect to sales tax level is negative at higher levels of sales tax.  Increasing the local 
sales tax significantly above the state average (or perhaps above the predominant rate 
within a local trade area) will reduce local retail activity and sales tax revenue.  Larger 
population and personal income also increase the level of trade.  Therefore, smaller 
population communities that tend to have lower income levels face the additional 
challenge of collecting less per capita than larger communities having the same sales tax 
rate.     14
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